


# Efficient Modular Exponentiation Based on Multiple Multiplications by a Common Operand

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  - Experimental Results
- 4 Conclusion

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# RSA Protocol (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman):

Alice generates the keys. She:

- Chooses two distinct prime numbers  $p$  and  $q$ ;
- Computes  $N = pq$ ;
- Computes  $\phi(N) = \phi(p)\phi(q) = (p-1)(q-1) = N - (p+q-1)$ ;
- Chooses an integer  $e$  such that  $1 < e < \phi(N)$  and  $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$ ;
- Solves for  $d$  given  $d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$ ;

→  $e$  is released as the public key exponent,

→  $d$  is kept as the private key exponent.

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→ Bob encrypts using Alice's public key  $e$ :

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→ The main operation is the  
Modular Exponentiation

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# Square-and-multiply

We consider an RSA modulus  $N$  such that  $N < 2^{wn}$ .

## Square-and-multiply

**Require:**  $N$  the RSA modulus,  $g$  and  $e = (e_{k-1}, \dots, e_0)_2$  integers  $\in [0, \dots, N]$ , with  $e_{k-1} = 1$ .

**Ensure:**  $X = g^e \pmod N$

### Left-to-right

```

 $X \leftarrow g$ 
for  $i = k - 2$  downto  $0$  do
   $X \leftarrow X^2 \pmod N$ 
  if  $e_i = 1$  then
     $X \leftarrow X \cdot g \pmod N$ 
return  $(X = g^e)$ 

```

### Right-to-left

```

 $X \leftarrow 1$ 
for  $i = 0$  to  $k - 1$  do
  if  $e_i = 1$  then
     $X \leftarrow X \cdot g \pmod N$ 
   $g \leftarrow g^2 \pmod N$ 
return  $(X = g^e)$ 

```

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# Simple Power Analysis

## RSA Left-to-right Square-and-multiply

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Ensure:  $X = g^e \pmod N$

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
for  $i = k - 2$  downto 0 do

$X \leftarrow X^2 \pmod N$

if  $e_i = 1$  then

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return ( $X = g^e$ )



# Simple Power Analysis

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
for  $i = k - 2$  downto 0 do

$X \leftarrow X^2 \pmod N$  → A squaring corresponds to a low crenel

if  $e_i = 1$  then

$X \leftarrow X \cdot g \pmod N$

return ( $X = g^e$ )



# Simple Power Analysis

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
for  $i = k - 2$  downto 0 do

$X \leftarrow X^2 \pmod N$

    if  $e_i = 1$  then

$X \leftarrow X \cdot g \pmod N$  → A multiplication corresponds to a high crenel

return ( $X = g^e$ )



# Simple Power Analysis

## RSA Left-to-right Square-and-multiply


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→ Vulnerable: the sequence of operations leaks the secret scalar  
(no regularity.)

# Montgomery Binary Ladder

## Montgomery

**Require:**  $e = (e_{t-1}, \dots, e_1, e_0)$  with  $e_{t-1} = 1, g \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$

**Ensure:**  $X = g^e \pmod N$

- 1:  $X_0 \leftarrow g, X_1 \leftarrow g^2 \pmod N$
- 2: **for**  $i$  from  $t - 2$  **downto** 0 **do**
- 3:   **if**  $(e_i = 0)$  **then**
- 4:      $X_1 \leftarrow X_0 \cdot X_1 \pmod N, X_0 \leftarrow X_0^2 \pmod N$
- 5:   **else**
- 6:      $X_0 \leftarrow X_0 \cdot X_1 \pmod N, X_1 \leftarrow X_1^2 \pmod N$
- 7: **return**  $(X_0)$

## Basic Montgomery's Ladder Modular Exponentiation

# Regular Exponentiation Algorithms

Joye and Tunstall suggested a  $2^t$ -ary recoding **without zero digits**:

## Unsigned-Digit Recoding Algorithm

**Require:**  $e \geq 1$ ,  $m = 2^t$ ,  $\ell$  the  $m$ -ary length of  $e$  and  $N$  the RSA modulus

**Ensure:**  $e = (e_{\ell-1}, \dots, e_0)$  with  $e_i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq \ell - 2$

1:  $s \leftarrow (1, 1, \dots, 1)_m$

2:  $e' \leftarrow e - s \pmod N$

3: **for**  $i = 0$  to  $\ell - 2$  **do**

4:    $d \leftarrow e' \pmod m$

5:    $e' \leftarrow \lfloor e'/m \rfloor$

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Then, the addition without carry leads to the 0-less recoding:



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$$e = 197504023$$

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 e' \pmod N & = & 0 \ 8 \ 6 \ 3 \ 9 \ 2 \ 9 \ 1 \ 2 \\
 s & = & 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \\
 \hline
 \text{recoding} & = & 1 \ 9 \ 7 \ 4 \ 10 \ 3 \ 10 \ 2 \ 3
 \end{array}$$

# Regular Exponentiation Algorithms

Joye and Tunstall suggested a  $2^t$ -ary recoding **without zero digits**:

## Unsigned-Digit Recoding Algorithm

**Require:**  $e \geq 1$ ,  $m = 2^t$ ,  $\ell$  the  $m$ -ary length of  $e$  and  $N$  the RSA modulus

**Ensure:**  $e = (e_{\ell-1}, \dots, e_0)$  with  $e_i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq \ell - 2$

1:  $s \leftarrow (1, 1, \dots, 1)_m$

2:  $e' \leftarrow e - s \pmod N$

3: **for**  $i = 0$  to  $\ell - 2$  **do**

4:    $d \leftarrow e' \pmod m$

5:    $e' \leftarrow \lfloor e'/m \rfloor$

6:    $e_i \leftarrow d + 1$

Example with  $t = 4$ ,  $m = 10_{10}$ :

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 e & = & 1 \ 9 \ 7 \ 5 \ 0 \ 4 \ 0 \ 2 \ 3 \\
 s & = & 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \\
 \hline
 e' \leftarrow e - s \pmod N & = & 0 \ 8 \ 6 \ 3 \ 9 \ 2 \ 9 \ 1 \ 2
 \end{array}$$

Then, the addition without carry leads to the 0-less recoding:

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 e' \pmod N & = & 0 \ 8 \ 6 \ 3 \ 9 \ 2 \ 9 \ 1 \ 2 \\
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 \hline
 \text{recoding} & = & 1 \ 9 \ 7 \ 4 \ 10 \ 3 \ 10 \ 2 \ 3
 \end{array}$$

# Regular Exponentiation Algorithms

## Regular $2^t$ -ary Square-and-multiply

**Require:**  $g$ , Joye-Tunstall recoding of  $e = (e_{k-1}, \dots, e_0) < N$

**Ensure:**  $X = g^e \pmod N$

### Left-to-right

```

 $Y_1 \leftarrow g$ 
for  $i = 2$  to  $2^t$  do
     $Y_i \leftarrow Y_{i-1} \cdot g \pmod N$ 
 $X \leftarrow Y_{e_{k-1}}$ 
for  $i = k-2$  downto  $0$  do
     $X \leftarrow X^{2^t} \pmod N$ 
     $X \leftarrow X \cdot Y_{e_i} \pmod N$ 
return  $(X = g^e)$ 

```

### Right-to-left

```

 $X \leftarrow g, Y_i \leftarrow 1, i \in \{1, \dots, 2^t\}$ 
for  $i = 0$  to  $k-1$  do
     $Y_{e_i} \leftarrow Y_{e_i} \cdot X \pmod N$ 
     $X \leftarrow X^{2^t} \pmod N$ 
    // Final reconstruction
     $X \leftarrow Y_{2^t}$ 
for  $i = 2^t - 1$  downto  $1$  do
     $Y_i \leftarrow Y_i \cdot Y_{i+1} \pmod N$ 
     $X \leftarrow X \cdot Y_i \pmod N$ 
return  $(X = g^e)$ 

```

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## Montgomery Modular Multiplication

Let  $A$  and  $B$  in  $[0, N[$ . Let us set  $C = A \times B, C < N^2$ .

Montgomery reduction of  $C = A \times B$ :

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Montgomery reduction of  $C = A \times B$ :

One set  $Q \leftarrow A \times B \times (-N^{-1}) \pmod{2^{wn}}$ , then the division

$$Y \leftarrow (A \times B + Q \times N) / 2^{wn}.$$

is exact.



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
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
Montgomery representation:  $\tilde{A} = A \times 2^{wn} \pmod{N}$ .

$$\tilde{A} \times \tilde{B} \times 2^{-wn} \pmod{N} = (AB) \times 2^{wn} \pmod{N}$$

# SmallRed: One Word Reduction



# SmallRed: One Word Reduction



## SmallRed (one word)

**Require:** A modulus  $N < 2^{wn-2}$  and a positive integer  $X = (x_{n'-1}, \dots, x_0)_{2^w}$  of  $n'$  words and  $N' = (-N^{-1}) \bmod 2^w$

**Ensure:**  $Y = X \cdot 2^{-w} \bmod N$  with  $Y < X/2^w + N$


- 1:  $q \leftarrow x_0 \cdot N' \bmod 2^w$
- 2:  $Y \leftarrow (X + q \cdot N)/2^w$
- 3: **return**  $Y$

# Block Montgomery Multiplication

$$ABR^{-1} \bmod N = \left(\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j 2^{wj}\right) \cdot A \cdot 2^{-wn} \bmod N$$

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# Block Montgomery Multiplication

Complexity:

operation	# word-multiplications	# word additions
$ABR^{-1} \bmod N$	$2n^2 + n$	$4n^2 + 2n - 1$
$A^2R^{-1} \bmod N$	$\frac{3}{2}n^2 + \frac{5}{2}n - 1$	$3n^2 + 5n - 1$

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# Our Objective

Our objective is to speed-up the SPA-resistant algorithms.

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# CombinedMontMul A · B, A · C

The Block Montgomery Modular multiplication computes:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A \cdot B \cdot R^{-1} &= \left( \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j 2^{wj} \right) \cdot A \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} \pmod N \\
 &= \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j A \cdot 2^{-w(n+1-j)} \pmod N \\
 &= \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j (A \cdot 2^{-w(n-1-j)} \pmod N) 2^{-2w} \pmod N \\
 &= \left( \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j A^{(j)} \right) \cdot 2^{-2w} \pmod N \tag{1}
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $A^{(j)} = A 2^{-w(n-1-j)} \pmod N$  for  $j = 0, \dots, n-1$ . With the same for  $A \cdot C \cdot R^{-1}$ , one obtains

$$A \cdot C \cdot R^{-1} = \left( \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} c_j A^{(j)} \right) \cdot 2^{-2w} \pmod N. \tag{2}$$

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The Block Montgomery Modular multiplication computes:

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 A \cdot B \cdot R^{-1} &= \left( \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j 2^{wj} \right) \cdot A \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} \pmod N \\
 &= \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j A \cdot 2^{-w(n+1-j)} \pmod N \\
 &= \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j (A \cdot 2^{-w(n-1-j)} \pmod N) 2^{-2w} \pmod N \\
 &= \left( \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j A^{(j)} \right) \cdot 2^{-2w} \pmod N \tag{1}
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $A^{(j)} = A 2^{-w(n-1-j)} \pmod N$  for  $j = 0, \dots, n-1$ . With the same for  $A \cdot C \cdot R^{-1}$ , one obtains

$$A \cdot C \cdot R^{-1} = \left( \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} c_j A^{(j)} \right) \cdot 2^{-2w} \pmod N. \tag{2}$$

# CombinedMontMul $A \cdot B, A \cdot C$ : Shared Computations

Therefore, the values  $A^{(j)}$  are shared by both multiplications:

$$\begin{aligned} A &= A^{(n-1)} \\ \text{SmallRed}(A^{(n-1)}) &= A \cdot 2^{-w} \pmod N \\ &= A^{(n-2)}, \\ \text{SmallRed}(A^{(n-2)}) &= (A \cdot 2^{-w}) \cdot 2^{-w} \pmod N \\ &= A^{(n-3)}, \\ &\vdots \\ \text{SmallRed}(A^{(1)}) &= (A \cdot 2^{-w(n-2)}) \cdot 2^{-w} \pmod N \\ &= A \cdot 2^{-w(n-1)} = A^{(0)}. \end{aligned}$$



# CombinedMontMul A · B, A · C: Algorithm

## CombinedMontMul(A, B, C)

**Require:** the modulus  $N < 2^{wn-2}$ , three integers  $A = (a_{n-1}, \dots, a_0)_2$ ,  $B = (b_{n-1}, \dots, b_0)_2$ ,  $C = (c_{n-1}, \dots, c_0)_2$  such that  $A, B, C < 2N$ ,  $w$  the word size,  $R = 2^{w(n+1)}$  the Montgomery constant.

**Ensure:**  $Y = A \cdot B \cdot R^{-1} \pmod N$  and  $Z = A \cdot C \cdot R^{-1} \pmod N$

1:  $X \leftarrow A$

2:  $Y \leftarrow b_{n-1} \cdot X$ ,  $Z \leftarrow c_{n-1} \cdot X$

3: **for**  $j = n - 2$  **downto** 0 **do**

4:  $q \leftarrow |X|_{2^w N'} \pmod{2^w}$

5:  $X \leftarrow (X + q \cdot N) / 2^w$  // =  $A^{(j)}$  for  $j = n - 2, \dots, 0$

6:  $Y \leftarrow Y + b_j \cdot X$ ,  $Z \leftarrow Z + c_j \cdot X$

7:  $Y \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(Y)$ ,  $Z \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(Z)$

8:  $Y \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(Y)$ ,  $Z \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(Z)$

9: **return**  $Y$  and  $Z$

# CombinedMontMul A · B, A · C: Complexity Comparison

By sharing the computations of  $A^{(j)}$ , we reduce the complexity of the global computation of both multiplications  $A \cdot B, A \cdot C$ :

Operation	Algorithm	# ADD	# MUL
$AB, AC$	Two MontMuls	$8n^2 + 4n - 2$	$4n^2 + 2n$
$AB, A^2$	MontMul and MontSqu	$7n^2 + 7n - 2$	$\frac{7}{2}n^2 + \frac{7}{2}n - 1$
$AB, AC$	CombinedMontMul	$6n^2 + 9n + 1$	$3n^2 + 4n + 3$

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$$A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$$

Given  $A \in \{0, \dots, N-1\}$  and  $B_i, i = 1, \dots, \ell$ , we want to compute:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_1 &= A \cdot B_1 \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} \pmod{N}, \\ Y_2 &= A \cdot B_2 \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} \pmod{N}, \\ &\vdots \\ Y_\ell &= A \cdot B_\ell \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} \pmod{N}. \end{aligned}$$

$$A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$$

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We expand each multiplication  $A \cdot B_i \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} \pmod N$  relatively to  $B_i$  and rewrite the product as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} A \cdot B_i \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} &= \left( \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_{i,j} 2^{wj} \right) \cdot A^{-w(n+1)} \pmod N \\ &= \left( \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_{i,j} A^{(j)} \right) \cdot 2^{-2w} \pmod N. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Optimisations  $A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$ : Complexity

Operation	Algorithm	# ADD	# MUL
$AB_i,$ $i = 1, \dots, \ell$	$\ell$ MontMuls	$\ell(4n^2 + 2n - 1)$	$\ell(2n^2 + n)$
$AB_i,$ $i = 1, \dots, \ell$	$\ell \times$ MultByComOp and $1 \times$ PrecomMultByComOp	$\ell(2n^2 + 5n + 1)$ $+(2n + 1)(n - 1)$	$\ell(n^2 + 2n + 2)$ $+(n^2 - 1)$

Optimisations  $A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$ : Complexity

Operation	Algorithm	# ADD	# MUL
$AB_i,$ $i = 1, \dots, \ell$	$\ell$ MontMuls	$\ell(4n^2 + 2n - 1)$	$\ell(2n^2 + n)$
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Optimisations  $A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$ : Complexity

Operation	Algorithm	# ADD	# MUL
$AB_i,$ $i = 1, \dots, \ell$	$\ell$ MontMuls	$\ell(4n^2 + 2n - 1)$	$\ell(2n^2 + n)$
$AB_i,$ $i = 1, \dots, \ell$	$\ell \times$ MultByComOp and $1 \times$ PrecomMultByComOp	$\ell(2n^2 + 5n + 1)$ $+(2n + 1)(n - 1)$	$\ell(n^2 + 2n + 2)$ $+(n^2 - 1)$

PrecomMultByComOp  $\rightarrow$  computations of all  $A^{(j)}$ .

Storage required:  $\rightarrow n \times (n \text{ word operand } A^{(j)})$ .

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# Montgomery Ladder with $A \cdot B, A \cdot C$

## Montgomery Ladder with CombinedMontMul( $A, B, C$ )

**Require:**  $N < 2^{wn-1}$  and  $G \in \{0, \dots, N-1\}$  and an exponent  $e = (e_{k-1}, \dots, e_0)_2$ ,  $w$  the word size and  $R = 2^{w(n+1)}$  the Montgomery constant.

**Ensure:**  $G^e \bmod N$

- 1:  $X_0 \leftarrow R \bmod N$
- 2: //conversion  $X_1 \leftarrow G \cdot R^2 \cdot R^{-1} \bmod N$
- 3:  $X_1 \leftarrow \text{MontMul}(G, R^2 \bmod N)$
- 4:  $X_1 \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(X_1)$
- 5: **for**  $i = k - 1$  **downto**  $0$  **do**
- 6:    $X_{1-e_i}, X_{e_i} \leftarrow \text{CombinedMontMul}(X_{e_i}, X_{1-e_i}, X_{e_i})$
- 7: // conversion  $X_0 \leftarrow (G^e \cdot R) \cdot R^{-1} \bmod N$
- 8:  $X_0 \leftarrow \text{MontMul}(X_0, 1)$ ,  $X_0 \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(X_0)$
- 9: **return**  $X_0$

# Right-to-left Regular Exponentiation with $A \cdot B, A \cdot C$

## Right-to-left regular $2^t$ -ary exponentiation with CombinedMontMul

**Require:**  $N < 2^{wn-2}$  the modulus, an integer  $0 \leq G < N$ , an exponent  $e = (e_{k-1}, \dots, e_0)_{2^t}$  with  $e_i \in \{1, \dots, 2^t\}$ ,  $R = 2^{w(n+1)}$  the Montgomery constant.

**Ensure:**  $G^e \bmod N$

```

1:  $X \leftarrow \text{MontMul}(G, R^2 \bmod N)$ ,  $X \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(X)$  //  $X = G \cdot R \bmod N$ 
2: for  $i = 1$  to  $2^t$  do
3:    $Y_i \leftarrow R \bmod N$ 
4: for  $i = 0$  to  $k - 1$  do
5:    $Y_{e_i}, X \leftarrow \text{CombinedMontMul}(X, Y_{e_i}, X)$ 
6:   for  $j = 1$  to  $t - 1$  do
7:      $X \leftarrow \text{MontSqu}(X)$ ,  $X \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(X)$ 
8: // Final reconstruction
9:  $Z \leftarrow Y_{2^t}$ 
10:  $Y_{2^t-1} \leftarrow \text{MontMul}(Y_{2^t-1}, Y_{2^t})$ 
11:  $Y_{2^t-1} \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(Y_{2^t-1})$ 
12: for  $i = 2^t - 1$  downto 2 do
13:    $Z, Y_{i-1} \leftarrow \text{CombinedMontMul}(Y_i, Z, Y_{i-1})$ 
14:  $Z \leftarrow \text{MontMul}(Z, Y_1)$ ,  $Z \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(Z)$ 
15:  $Z \leftarrow \text{MontMul}(Z, 1)$ ,  $Z \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(Z)$ 
16: return  $Z$ 

```

# Left-to-right Regular Exponentiation with

$$A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$$

## Left-to-right regular $2^t$ -ary exponentiation with MultByComOp

**Require:**  $N < 2^{wn-1}$  the modulus, an integer  $0 \leq G < N$ , an exponent  $e = (e_{k-1}, \dots, e_0)_2$  with  $e_{k-1} \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ ,  $R = 2^{w(n+1)}$  the Montgomery constant.

**Ensure:**  $G^e \bmod N$

```

1:  $G_1 \leftarrow \text{MontMul}(G, R^2 \bmod N), G_1 \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(G_1) // G_1 = G \cdot 2^{w(n+1)} \bmod N$ 
2:  $X \leftarrow R$ 
3:  $G_1^{(0)}, \dots, G_1^{(n-1)} \leftarrow \text{PrecompMultByComOp}(G_1)$ 
4: for  $i = 2$  to  $2^t$  do
5:    $G_i \leftarrow \text{MultByComOp}(G_{i-1}, G_1^{(0)}, \dots, G_1^{(n-1)})$ 
6:    $G_i^{(0)}, \dots, G_i^{(n-1)} \leftarrow \text{PrecompMultByComOp}(G_i)$ 
7: for  $i = k - 1$  downto  $0$  do
8:   for  $j = 1$  to  $t$  do
9:      $X \leftarrow \text{MontSqu}(X), X \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(X) // X \leftarrow X^2 \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} \bmod N$ 
10:     $X \leftarrow \text{MultByComOp}(X, G_{e_j}^{(0)}, \dots, G_{e_j}^{(n-1)})$ 
11:  $X \leftarrow \text{MontMul}(X, 1), X \leftarrow \text{SmallRed}(X) // X \leftarrow X \cdot 2^{-w(n+1)} \bmod N$ 
12: return  $X$ 

```

# Complexity Comparison

Complexities of modular exponentiation for 2048 bits

	ML	ML CMM	R-to-L	R-to-L CMM	L-to-R	L-to-R MBCO
#ADD/ $10^3$ Improv.	15143	13183 12.9%	8595	8253 4%	8466	7804 7.9%
#MUL/ $10^3$ Improv.	7506	6564 12.6%	4296	4120 4.1%	4232	3896 7.9%
Storage req.	-		-		256 KB with $t = 5$	

ML=Montgomery-ladder, R-to-L= Right-to-left, L-to-R=Left-to-right

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# Implementation Performances

- Intel Core i7 (turbo-boost and hyperthreading deactivated), gcc 4.8.2
- GMP 6.0.0 library for  $1 \times n$  multiplications and  $n \times n$  additions

Algorithm	1024 bits		2048 bits		4096 bits	
	#CC/ $10^3$	Imp. ratio	#CC/ $10^3$	Imp. ratio	#CC/ $10^3$	Imp. ratio
Mont-ladder	3068	9.0%	20643	9.1%	153443	14.6%
Mont-ladder with CMM	2793		18773		131011	
Right-to-left	1857	0.1%	11796	1.7%	87081	4.0%
Right-to-left with CMM	1855		11596		83599	
Left-to-right	1858	-1%	11734	3.1 %	83354	8.3 %
Left-to-right with MBCO	1877		11368		77745	



# Algorithm and Implementation Optimisation

- 1 Problematic
  - RSA Protocol
  - The Modular Exponentiation
  - Simple Power Analysis, Counter-measure
- 2 Modular Multiplication
  - Montgomery Modular Multiplication
  - Our Objective
- 3 Contributions
  - $A \cdot B, A \cdot C$
  - $A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$
  - Application to SPA Protected Modular Exponentiations
  - Experimental Results
- 4 Conclusion

## Conclusion:

In this work, we proposed:

- Two Modular Multiplications by a common operand  $A \cdot B, A \cdot C$ :  
→ Improvement of two modular multiplications up to 25%;

## Conclusion:

In this work, we proposed:

- Two Modular Multiplications by a common operand  $A \cdot B, A \cdot C$ :  
→ Improvement of two modular multiplications up to 25%;
- Multiple Modular Multiplications by a common operand  $A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$ :  
→ Improvement of  $\ell$  modular multiplications up to 50%;

## Conclusion:

In this work, we proposed:

- Two Modular Multiplications by a common operand  $A \cdot B, A \cdot C$ :  
→ Improvement of two modular multiplications up to **25%**;
- Multiple Modular Multiplications by a common operand  $A \cdot B_0, A \cdot B_1, \dots, A \cdot B_\ell$ :  
→ Improvement of  $\ell$  modular multiplications up to **50%**;
- Application to SPA protected RSA modular exponentiations:  
→ the Montgomery Ladder is improved by **9 to 15 %**;  
→ the Right-to-left regular  $2^t$ -ary exponentiation is improved by up to **4 %**;  
→ the Left-to-right regular  $2^t$ -ary exponentiation is improved by up to **8 %**.

Thank you for your attention,

Any questions ?

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